THE liquidators have demonstrated that the failed Babcock & Brown routinely declared dividends before it had the profits to cover them.
The question now is what, if anything, the liquidator can do about it?
The revelation came on Wednesday, at a public examination of former B&B chief executive Phil Green during a liquidator’s hearing in the Federal Court. Green was grilled by Peter Wood, senior counsel for liquidator Deloitte.
B&B is purely a holding company. The group’s assets are held by the operating subsidiary Babcock & Brown International which managed to stay out of administration.
B&B’s revenue came almost entirely in the form of dividends from BBI which enabled B&B to then declare dividends to shareholders of the listed company. At least, that’s what should have happened. Section 254T of the Corporations Act says dividends may only be paid out of profits. For that to happen B&B would first have had to receive dividends from BBI before it could declare dividends of its own.
Wood showed that the last dividend paid by B&B — a final dividend of 33c a share, 50 per cent franked, for the year to December 31, 2007– did not come from retained earnings but from dividends received from BBI after the close of the financial year.
The dividend required $97 million, yet at December 31, 2007 B&B had retained earnings of only $14.9m, which meant that B&B paid out at least $82m more than it was legally entitled to do.
Those were funds that may otherwise have been available for creditors. It’s arguable as to whether payment of the $97m was prudent, given the pressures that were already beginning to mount against B&B at the time.
A breach of section 254T doesn’t give rise to either a civil or a criminal penalty.
However, a possible option for the liquidator may be to seek to claw back the dividend payment from directors, on the grounds that they breached their fiduciary duties in paying the dividend.
The then directors were Jim Babcock (chairman) Phil Green (chief executive), Elizabeth Nosworthy, James Fantaci, Ian Martin, Dieter Rampl, Martin Rey, Joe Roby and Michael Sharpe.
Section 180 requires directors to exercise the degree of care and diligence of a reasonable person, to act in good faith in the company’s best interests and for a proper purpose, to not improperly use their position to advantage themselves or others, or to cause detriment to the company.
A B&B board committee took the decision to declare dividends but that does not absolve the board from responsibility. Green was a member of that committee and he received around $4m.
Another possibility may be that the liquidator could take civil proceedings against the directors for repayment of the dividends on the grounds that it constituted an unlawful capital reduction.
The argument would be that if the 2007 final dividend wasn’t paid from profits then it was paid from capital.
Section 256B1 says a company may reduce its capital if the reduction is fair and reasonable, does not materially prejudice its ability to pay its creditors and is approved by shareholders. The payment was not approved by the shareholders.
Section 256D1 says contravention of section 256B1 does not affect the validity of the capital reduction and the company is not guilty of an offence, but any person involved in the contravention is open to civil proceedings.
If the liquidator does take action over the dividend payment it will be interesting to see if IMF (Aust) funds the claim. IMF is already funding at least one legal claim for the liquidator, where B&B has brought proceedings in California claiming it is entitled to $9.5m which is held pursuant to the Babcock & Brown Executive Achievement Share Trust Deed.
The trust was formed to make distributions to overseas employees, many in the US, in relation to its bonus schemes. The trustee is located in California.
When B&B was placed in administration in March last year the trust held $9.5m which had not been distributed. B&B and BBI both lay claim to those funds.
It will probably be of no consolation to former B&B directors to know that legislation was before Parliament when the federal election was called to change the Corporations Act so that dividends no longer have to be paid only from profits but can also be paid out of cash flow, provided the company will remain solvent after payment.
Close, but fair
IN the end, the independent expert Grant Samuel views the proposed Newcrest merger/takeover of Lihir Gold as fair and in the best interests of Lihir shareholders, but it was a close run thing.
Grant Samuel values Lihir in the $4.28 to $4.83 a share range, well above their pre-Newcrest price — and, for that matter, their current price.
Newcrest is offering 1 of its shares for each 8.43 Lihir shares, plus 22.5c for each Lihir share.
Grant Samuel has valued Newcrest in a range of $33.50 to $34.50 a share, which values its offer in a range of $4.20 to $4.32.
On that basis, the high value of the consideration is slightly below the expert’s low value for Lihir, but as it is within the value range it qualifies as fair (albeit marginally).
Newcrest shares fell a further 39c yesterday to $32.92, which values the offer at $4.13 a share. Lihir shares dipped 4c to $4.06, which is 5 per cent to 15 per cent below the expert’s assessed value range, and indicates that it is tracking the Newcrest offer price.
The Lihir valuation is based on a gold price in the $US1200 to $US1240 an oz range and the dollar at US86c, with each 1c movement equivalent to 5c a Lihir share. Gold is now just under $US1200 an oz and the exchange rate is US87.75c.
Grant Samuel noted that when the proposal was recommended by the Lihir board it represented a premium of 36 per cent to 40 per cent to Lihir’s share price, but that Newcrest had subsequently underperformed global gold equities, largely because of a fall in the price of copper, which currently contributes more than half of Newcrest’s earnings.
Acquisition of Lihir would change the copper/gold equation and probably ensure that the shares attract the premium that investors attach to predominantly gold producers.
While the offer at present is only marginally fair it should be noted that Lihir has searched extensively, but so far in vain, for alternative offers, which suggests that the other potential bidders consider the Newcrest proposal already represents full value.
However, the Newcrest proposal is a scheme of arrangement and it’s possible, for strategic reasons, that a rival could lob a proposal shortly before the Lihir shareholder meeting to vote on the proposal. For that reason Grant Samuel’s view that the Newcrest proposal is in the best interests of Lihir shareholders is subject to the absence of a superior proposal.
The merger would create a $25 billion company and would be the world’s fifth largest gold miner. In the absence of the Newcrest proposal, Lihir’s share price would almost certainly be significantly lower.
bfrith@acenet.com.au